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Some Thoughts on the Relevance of
Customer Behavior to Discrimination
Law: Who Counts as a "Customer"?
Patrick S. Shint
In Discrimination by Customers,' Katharine Bartlett and Mitu Gulati draw
attention to the apparent asymmetry in the law's treatment of "firms" and
"customers." Firms are prohibited from engaging in discrimination against
customers. Customers, however, are generally free to act on discriminatory
preferences in their interactions with firms even though, as Bartlett and Gulati
show, discrimination by customers can hardly be regarded as benign. They
claim that "[ilt is a puzzle why we generally take for granted the right of
customers to discriminate when they exercise their buying power."'
In arguing for greater legal attention to the problem of discrimination
by customers, Bartlett and Gulati consider and persuasively reject two possible
arguments for limiting discrimination liability to firms (the "efficacy" and
"privacy and individual autonomy" rationales) and then offer a proposed legal
intervention to address discriminatory customer conduct.3 Their discussion of
these issues is rich, nuanced, and warrants further inquiry. But my focus in
this Response will not be on the efficacy or autonomy arguments, nor on the
specifics of Bartlett and Gulati's proposal for reform. Rather, this Response
offers a perspective that the authors do not seem to consider. Although they
discuss at length the arguments against liability for customer discrimination,
they never explicitly set forth their understanding of the positive justifications
for antidiscrimination law, other than their implicit assumption that the law
is concerned with the harms of discrimination. They express puzzlement that
the law prohibits discrimination by firms but not by customers, but they spend
little time discussing why the law prohibits discrimination by firms in the first
place. Is the law's apparent apathy toward customer discrimination as
puzzling as Bartlett and Gulati claim from the perspective of the basic
principles that underlie antidiscrimination law?
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See generally Katharine T. Bartlett & Mitu Gulati, Disuiminationby Customers, 1o2 IOWA L.
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Id. at 226.
Id. at 228-41, 249-50.
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A preliminary difficulty in trying to understand the theoretical
significance of "firm" versus "customer" discrimination lies in determining
who constitutes a customer according to Bartlett and Gulati. They do not
explicitly define the term, although the examples they discuss are strongly
suggestive. They deftly describe numerous everyday situations where the law
seems to leave people free to make transactional choices based on
discriminatory preferences relating to race, sex, religion, and so on.4 But the
authors leave it largely to the reader to infer how these examples conceptually
hang together. They presuppose a broad concept of customer discrimination
that includes tipping a waiter in a restaurant, choosing a store clerk to interact
with, watching a sporting event, hailing an Uber, and filling out a student
course evaluation.5 It may indeed be puzzling, as Bartlett and Gulati suppose,
that all of these actions are outside the scope of discrimination law, but one
might first ask a more basic question: what exactly warrants lumping them
together into the category of customer discrimination? Perhaps if we can
understand just what it is that makes a customer a customer, we can gain
insight into the basis for antidiscrimination law's apparent lack of concern
about customer discrimination.
To begin, I am not so sure that the law's reticence with regard to some of
the forms of discriminatory conduct discussed by Bartlett and Gulati is truly a
function of the actor's status as a customer, as opposed to some other latent
feature of the relevant context. The authors point out, for example, that
"[c]ustomers may avoid doing business with a gay photographer because they
are disgusted by homosexuality" without fear of legal liability.6 This seems
quite true; but on the other hand, it is also probably true that the law would
have little to say about a self-employed photographer who avoids dealing with
same-sex customers for homophobic reasons. And the same could be said of
a housekeeper who takes on only white clients; or a door-to-door salesman
who chooses to peddle his wares only in white neighborhoods. Legal liability
seems no more likely for these actors,7 who are not "customers" in any
ordinary sense, than for Bartlett and Gulati's white diners who prefer cafes
with white clienteles or xenophobic shoppers who steer clear of
turban-wearing clerks.8 Bartlett and Gulati are surely right that in many
contexts, "the law does not prohibit discrimination by customers."! But in

4.
5.

6.
7.

Id. at 224-26, 2s31-34.
Id. at 224-25, 228, 232, 253.
Id. at

226.

.

As Bartlett and Gulati explain, the language of section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of
t866 appears to create a civil right of action for racial discrimination in private contracting
activity, but there are few, if any, cases reporting the imposition of liability in connection with
such an action. Id. at 225 fl.12, 225-26.
8. Id. at 225-26.
9. Id. at 21 5
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some of these contexts, the law also does not seem to prohibit discrimination
by the party on the other side of the transaction either.
This suggests the possibility that the law's approach to customer
discrimination might be better understood as a piece of a larger puzzle, rather
than something that could purport to make sense on its own. In other words,
the most viable explanation of the legal permissibility of customer
discrimination may require enlarging our inquiry to consider the broader
principles that justify the interventions of antidiscrimination law in the first
place. Given that the law does not even pretend to be anything close to
comprehensive and universal in its coverage, what exactly is it that the law is
trying to accomplish?
One place to begin our broader inquiry is in the employment context,
where no one questions the basic legitimacy of antidiscrimination
prohibitions. In this context, Bartlett and Gulati do not mention a rather
glaring asymmetry in the application of the law: employers are expressly
prohibited from discriminating against employees, but employees are not
prohibited from discriminating against employers. Employees are free to
make their own employment decisions based on discriminatory preferences
relating to the race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of their potential
employers, co-workers, and clientele. It is understandable that Bartlett and
Gulati do not discuss discrimination by employees, insofar as employees
presumably do not count as customers in their sense," but the apparent
permissibility of employee discrimination arguably raises the same problem
as the puzzle of customer discrimination. Why is the party on one side of the
employment relationship subject to antidiscrimination liability while the
other side seems free to discriminate at will?
The question may seem contrived, but I think it is worth asking because
there are some answers that quickly suggest themselves; and I believe these
answers will help us understand the law's approach to customer
discrimination. We are not accustomed to thinking of employers as potential
victims of discrimination by employees, but many of Bartlett and Gulati's
insights about the possibility of customer discrimination could be thought to
suggest similar concerns about discrimination by employees. It is not difficult
to imagine scenarios in which workers engage in discriminatory conduct
against minority supervisors and managers because of bias, resentment, or
animus. Yet, if an employee were to engage in such conduct, they would not
be held liable for any resulting harm under current federal employment
discrimination law.12 Following Bartlett and Gulati, we might then ask: if the

See42 U.S.C. § 2oooe-2(a) (2012).
11. Indeed, if the employer-employee relationship were analogized to a customer
transaction, the employer might seem to correspond to the role of the customer, insofar as the
employer is paying for services to be rendered by the employee. The reason why employers are
not customers in the relevant sense will become clearer in the discussion that follows.
12. Employers can be held vicariously liable for the discriminatory actions of "supervisors"
10.
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purpose of employment discrimination law is to reduce the prevalence of
discrimination and minimize the social harms that flow from discriminatory
conduct, then why should employee discrimination be outside the law's
reach?
Two responses come to mind, both of which may help us see the puzzle
of customer discrimination in a broader theoretical context. The first and
perhaps more obvious answer is that an employer who is "victimized" by an
employee's discriminatory conduct can avail itself of self-help. If the
discriminatory actor is an at-will employee, the employer is free to discharge
him; and even in a situation where the employer is contractually or legally
more constrained, the employee's discriminatory conduct will likely provide
a basis to terminate forjust cause. Thus, as a general matter, there is no need
to provide employers with antidiscrimination remedies against employees
because it is the employer who holds all of the relevant economic power.
The second response is that the question may rely on a faulty premise.
Our legal frameworks aim generally to reduce the occurrence of
discrimination throughout society and to prevent or remedy the harms
associated with discrimination. But this characterization of the purposes of
discrimination law is arguably overbroad if we are trying to identify plausible
rationales for our existing laws, which limit themselves to reach some but not
all modes of discriminatory conduct. If we are talking about Title VII in
particular, it would be more accurate to say that the original purpose of the
law was to remove status-based barriers that historically had prevented
members of socially disfavored and vulnerable groups from entering or
occupying the most desirable positions in the workplace.3 To be sure, Title
VII expresses a general commitment to reduce societal discrimination, but
the statute's specific goal is to foster equality of opportunity in employment.
From the perspective of that normative priority, there is a ready answer
to the question why Title VII prohibits employer discrimination against
employees but not vice versa. The law focuses on employers because it is they
who control the distribution of workplace opportunities and the terms and
conditions of workers' employment. As long as jobs are relatively scarce, the
primary barrier to equality of opportunity and workplace conditions is
employer discrimination, not the conduct of employees.
One might argue that discrimination by employees at the expense of
employers could, in certain circumstances, present a hindrance to full
equality of opportunity and of workplace conditions. That may well be true,
but even so, it is not particularly puzzling why employee discrimination is not

and might be liable for harassment carried out by non-supervisors if such harassment was
facilitated by the employer's negligence. See Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2443
(2013). However, employees per se cannot be held liable under Title VII, which prohibits
discrimination only by an "employer." See 42 U.S.C.
200oe (b), oooe-2 (a).

13.

SeeUnited Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 44g U.S. 193,

Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 43 1 (1971).

202-07

(1979); Griggs v. Duke
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a featured concern of the law. Mere employees do not have the power to hire,
fire, promote, or provide pay and benefits. Granted, they might, through
pervasive discriminatory behavior, create a hostile environment that
undermines genuine workplace equality. But in such a case, the employer
ultimately has the power, and is indeed charged with vicarious legal
responsibility, to eliminate the offending hostile conditions.4 In short, as real
as the possibility of employee discrimination may be, Title VII holds only
employers liable for discrimination because employers, not employees, have
power over opportunities for, and the terms and conditions of, employment
in their workplaces.
This explanation of Title VII's approach is broadly consistent with liberal
conceptions ofjustice in the context of a market-based economy. In a society
that allows some degree of economic inequality to exist, certain basic
requirements must be satisfied in order for that inequality to be regarded as
fair, or consistent with justice. One of those requirements is that the society's
institutional arrangements (including its laws) must ensure fair equality of
opportunity for all citizens. In order for that requirement to be satisfied,
"conditions must be such that those with equal talent who make equal efforts
have the same chance of occupying positions of status and power."m The
practice of employment discrimination is plainly inconsistent with the
requirement of fair equality of opportunity.'6 Discrimination by employees,
on the other hand, while perhaps no less morally offensive, is not so clearly a
threat to the satisfaction of that requirement for the reasons just discussed.'7
Thus, a society plagued by the practice of employment discrimination, if
committed to the attainment of the necessary conditions of justice, will have
compelling reason to place high priority on legal interventions that prohibit
such discrimination. But it might not have equally urgent reasons to enact
coercive legal measures to address discrimination by employees against
employers.
There might of course be other legitimate justifications for legal
interventions that specifically address discrimination by employees. For
example, according to liberal political philosophy, another basic condition of
justice is that no one can be deprived of a social basis for self-respect-i.e.,
social recognition consistent with regarding oneself as equally worthy of
pursuing and fulfilling one's chosen ends.' Widespread discrimination

14.

SeeBurlington Indus., Inc. v.Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998).

Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Race, Labor; and the Fair Equality of Opportunity Principle, 72
15.
FORDiAM L. REv. 1643, 1649 (2004) (discussingJohn Rawls' book, A Theoty of fustice).

16.

See id. at 1650.
This is not to deny that discrimination by employees is morally objectionable. The claim
here is that discrimination by employees against employers is not clearly a threat to fair equality
of opportunity.
17.

Jol

18.
See JollN RAwl S, JUSTIIC[E AS FAIRNESS: A RES'IAEMiNT 58-6o (Erin Kelly ed., 2oo1);
IN RAwiS, A Ti IEORY OF JuS'IICE 186 (Harvard Univ. Press rev. ed. Iggg).
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within a society could cause members of disfavored groups to feel socially
marginalized and to perceive their interests as being subordinate to the good
of more dominant groups. Such a society might have strong reasons to enact
thoroughgoing measures, beyond discrimination laws focusing on employers,
to bolster the universal entitlement to the social bases of self-respect.1 I do
not deny that such a society might exist, or that ours might be an example of
one. But the relevant point is that this sort of justification for
antidiscrimination interventions is distinguishable from the demand of fair
equality of opportunity that drives the prohibition of employment
discrimination.
Let us return, finally, to the problem of customer discrimination. Why
does current law allow customers to discriminate, even when such
discrimination is harmful? I believe the most promising line of response is
analogous to the answer developed above to the question of employee
discrimination. The primary concern of federal antidiscrimination law is not
necessarily to eradicate all conduct motivated by discriminatory preference or
bias, but to eliminate basic forms of injustice. In the workplace context,
employment discrimination law seeks to realize equality of opportunity and
equality in the terms and conditions of workers' employment. In other
contexts, antidiscrimination law seeks to ensure equal access to essential
goods, services and benefits such as housing and education. The law
intervenes as necessary to prevent unjust inequalities in access to these basic
opportunities and resources.
In short, the central concern of current antidiscrimination law is injustice
in the distribution of essential goods such as jobs, income, education, and
housing. The simplest explanation for the law's apparent indifference to
customer discrimination is that customers as such are not agents of
distribution. That is what makes them customers. 0 And since customers as
such do not distribute anything (except their own money), it follows that
customer discrimination need not be considered a significant cause of
injustice in the distribution of essential social goods. The conclusion is that
customer discrimination simply falls outside the central concern of
antidiscrimination law. Or so the argument can be understood.
I want to be clear that I am not putting this distributive justice argument
forward in opposition to Bartlett and Gulati's core claim that the law should do
more to address the harms of customer discrimination. Rather, I present it as
an alternative framework for their views. Bartlett and Gulati characterize the

19.

q.Michael

Blake, The Discriminating Shopper, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV.

1017,

1031 (2006)

(offering a Rawlsian analysis of the permissibility of catering to discriminatory customer
preferences).
20. And this is also why employers are not truly customers in Bartlett and Gulati's sense.
Like customers in some contexts, employers pay for the services of employees, but employers are
the opposite of mere customers because, collectively, they play a significant role in the
distribution of jobs and income.
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problem of customer discrimination as a puzzle about the lack of parity in the
treatment of customers and firms. The weakness of this framing is that from
the standpoint of concern for distributive justice, this asymmetry is not really
so puzzling after all: the law focuses on firms and employers because they have
distributive power, and it ignores "customers" because they do not. Of course,
Bartlett and Gulati can be understood as having much to say on that score.
Indeed, their assertion that "it is wrong to assume ... that discrimination by
customers and firm practices are distinct from one another"21 comes close to
a claim that customers do in fact have significant power to affect distributive
outcomes. But this is precisely my point. What I am suggesting is that instead
of setting up their analysis in the form of a "what's-good-for-the-goose-is-goodfor-the-gander" argument, it might be more strongly framed as a direct
response to the naive view that customer discrimination is irrelevant to
distributive justice.
When spun in this way, I think that it becomes clearer why many of
Bartlett and Gulati's insights have the intuitive power that they do. The
distributive justice perspective makes it obvious why discriminatory tipping
should be of legal concern: that is a context in which the restaurant patron
(customer) is empowered with distributive responsibility, and that power is
significantly magnified if tips constitute a significant portion of wages in the
restaurant industry. Similarly, in the context of the sharing economy,
customers have a great deal of power to affect the success level and incomes
of workers and owners, and patterns of customer discrimination in these
contexts could cause significant unjust economic distortions. Thus, concerns
of distributive justice could justify legal interventions, like those suggested by
Bartlett and Gulati, to curb that power.22 To generalize, the reason that
antidiscrimination law might want to take notice of customer behavior in
these arenas is not just that customer discrimination is harmful, but that
customers in these contexts have some of the functional characteristics of
actors who have allocative power over goods and resources in traditional
economic contexts-actors who reside in the heartland of antidiscrimination
law. 2-

21. Bartlett & Gulati, supra note 1, at 238.
22. Customer discrimination in the sharing economy and in other highly customer-oriented
service markets may also be of concern from the standpoint of distributive justice to the extent
that such discrimination can affect the social bases of self-respect. Widespread customer
discrimination could operate to perpetuate the social subordination and marginalization of
disfavored groups, which could be inconsistent with basic conditions of justice. For further
discussion of this point, see generally Blake, supra note 19. Although Bartlett and Gulati do not
explicitly focus on this argument, it strengthens their claim that antidiscrimination law should
not ignore customer behavior.
23. By the same token, the perspective of distributive justice explains why certain actors who
are not customers in the ordinary sense, such as the door-to-door salesman and the housekeeper
in my earlier discussion, also might not be of particular interest to discrimination law. Their
discriminatory approach to selecting their customers may not be of concern insofar as their
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In conclusion, from a certain perspective, it is natural to think of
customer discrimination as lying outside the scope of antidiscrimination law.
Antidiscrimination law has traditionally been concerned with building fair
equality of opportunity and preventing and rectifying injustices in the
distribution of essential goods and resources; and customers as such neither
provide employment opportunities nor have the power to control distributive
outcomes. Indeed, it is arguably the lack of primary allocative authority in the
economic market that makes a customer a customer in the first place.
Although Bartlett and Gulati do not explicitly frame their argument in these
terms, it could easily be recast as a claim that the law is wrong to assume that
employers and firms are the only actors relevant to the perspective of
distributivejustice. Bartlett and Gulati show that behavior by actors who might
be thought of as customers can have significant impacts on the value and
availability of employment opportunities and on distributive outcomes. This
is especially true in the context of the sharing economy, where the traditional
lines between customers, employers, and workers are blurred at best. Bartlett
and Gulati's insights may suggest that expanding antidiscrimination law to
take account of customer discrimination might not require a radical
departure from its existing justifications and, indeed, might be quite
consistent with the law's existing commitment to achieving the conditions
necessary for distributive justice.

choices do not tend to cause any unjust distribution of any important goods or resources-which
should be the case, provided that other housekeepers and salespeople can come to the market
to satisfy any market demand ignored by the discriminatory actors.

